ࡱ> 9 R]{bjbj&Bwl6666666J 8$ 4X $J5L : " 5555555$7 9256 25= 66 G5= = = 6 6 5= 5= &= cR,266 5 | @q3y: Ry: 5= JJ6666Guoxin Xing Fall 2007 Comprehensive Exam Definition (First Area): Political Economy: Communication and The Role of The State in Neo-Liberal Global Order Globalization seems to mean different things depending on ones vantage point (Held and McGrew 2002: 98-117; Bowles 2004). The political economy conceives of this process as the spatial agglomeration of capital, driven by transnational business and the state, leading to the transformation of the spaces through which commodities and information flow (Mosco 1996: 205). This perspective gives much attention to the nature of the current global order, the role of communication in the transformation of the global political economy and the restructuring of the state in the constitution of this order. For political economy, the capital, the state, social class and class power are primary analytical categories in understanding the ascendance of transnational media and media democratization (Mosco 1996; Zhao and Hackett 2005: 1-36). Nevertheless, the analytical categories in the political economy have been challenged by the vogue of globalization studies with the overemphasis on the decline of the state power and the rise of post-modern and poststructuralist thought which relativizes the power of the state. This comprehensive exam will examine competing theoretical frameworks of the nature of the global order, theories on the capitalist state and transformation, and their implications for resistance and emancipatory communication in the era of globalization. As Zhao (2007: 34) outlines, paradigms charactering the new global order range from Huntingtons class of civilizations on the right to diverse Marxist and poststructuralist approaches in the left, including Harveys capitalist imperialism, Panitch and Gidins informal American empire, Hardt and Negris Empire, and Ongs globalization as neo-liberal governmentality. Leaving the liberal approaches aside, I focus on the various leftist formulations of globalization which primarily include conventional notions of imperialism in classical political economy and the provocative conceptions of global capitalism in post-structuralism. Panitch and Gindin (2004) call the new global order as an informal American empire, in which the US state plays the central role in establishing the political requirements of capitalist social and market relations internationally. In running the empire, the American state depends on partners of states, conquered by neo-liberalism, to maintain the global capitalist order. Similarly, Harvey (2003) considers the formation of the global order as the neo-liberal American empire, a product of capitalism and the state simultaneously vying for control. He proposes the logic of territories and the logic of capital to establish his concept of capitalist imperialism, highlighting the overlooked fact that the alliance between politicians and capitalists manages a balance of state power and capitalism that is unstable. All those formulations of globalization echo the classical political economy perspective. As Sparks (2007: 21) argues, globalization should be better understood in terms of capitalist development, particularly the imperialist phase of capitalist development. Likewise, Meszaros (2001) perceives globalization as the global capitalism and the stage of global hegemonic imperialism with the United States as its overpowering force. This left strand of globalization studies characterizes what Poulantzas (Jessop 2002: 188-192) calls the internationalization of the capitalist relations and modifications of the national states. In this process, the nation states can neither be suppressed nor bypassed in the internationalization of capital. Poulantzas argues that the world dominated by multinational firms would not be borderless and stateless (Jessop 2002: 194). The political economic perspective has been abandoned by Hardt and Negri (2000). The two authors argue, nation-states are in retreat as the sovereignty of them is vanishing and being replaced by an emergent global sovereignty or Empire arising from the coalescence of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule with no clear international hierarchy (Hardt and Negri 2000:xii). Under the concept of Empire, national capital and the capitalist state are disappearing (Aronowitz and Bratsis 2002: xvii). As Browning (2005: 193) argues, Hardt and Negris interpretation of contemporary sovereignty and politics characterizes fashionable post-modern theory of globalization, which supersedes Marxism and former ideological standpoints of the Left. Browning calls the concept of Empire a globalist ideology of post-Marxism. The nation-state and national capitalism is also deconstructed by Ongs (2006) globalization as neo-liberalism governmentality. In her unsettling of the conventional notion of citizenship and sovereign power, however, Ong argues for local identities, multiple differences and particularities struggling for symbolic recognition. This is different from Hardt and Negri who contend that the Empire gives rise to a uniform global labor regime. The contending theoretical accounts of the global order are important for resistance and social movements to understand the terrain and site of their struggle for citizenship and emancipatory communication in the era of globalization. Before this topic is discussed, it is necessary to overview theories of the capitalist state to understand its transformation in globalization, the role of the state and the relationship between the state and the capital in the global order. In this context, we may identify theories of the capitalist state ranging from instrumentalist, structuralist and post-modern approaches to the state. What is regarded as instrumentalism is Ralph Milibands view of the Advanced Capitalist State as a tool of the capitalist class. This attracted considerable criticism, mostly from within Marxism. From the standpoint of French Marxist structuralism, Nicos Poulantzas argued that attention should be given to the structural factors which conditioned state action (Barrow 2002; Knuttila and Kubik 2000). For Poulantzas (McGrew 1996: 266), the ACS needs to secure the conditions for the continued reproduction of capitalist society, so it often acted relatively autonomously of the capitalist class. The state action was functional to the long-term stability of the capitalist order. But it might conflict with the short- term interests of the capitalist class. This constitutes a contradictory unit of dominant classes or fractions. Rejecting the structuralist explanation of the state, Offe points to the ACS caught in the contradiction between accumulation and legitimation, capitalism and democracy (McGrew 1996: 270). While he recognizes the capitalist nature of the contemporary western state, Offe conceives of the state in advanced capitalist societies as an actor pursuing its own interests and thus accorded it extensively autonomy from the capital. In the process of sustaining and reproducing its own programs, state managers must sustain and create the conditions for private capital accumulation, from which the state derived the revenues. The policies taken by the state are an outcome of political negotiation to reconcile the contradiction between accumulation and legitimacy. Poulantzas himself also attempted to reject a structuralist explanation of the state power in his later work (Knuttila and Kubik 2000: 120). As Jessop (2002: 212) argues, Poulantzas tried to develop a view of state power as a social relation that is reproduced in and through the interplay between the states institutional form and the changing nature of political forces. In return, emphasis is given on the nature of the capitalist state as a system of strategic selectivity and on the nature of political struggle as a field of competing strategies to attain hegemony. Following the trajectory opened by Poulantzas, Jessop (1990) asserts that the state as a social relation can be analyzed as the site, generator, and product of strategies. Bratsis (2002) argues, what Poulantzas terms the institutional materiality of the state is a historical product of a multiplicity of class practices and struggles. Jessops strategic theory of the state overcomes Poulantzass class reductionism by assigning materiality solely to institutions, thus denying the predetermined nature of functional imperatives and subjectivity (Bratsis 2002). Nevertheless, the emphasis on the relative autonomy of the state does not dissolve the state as a central terrain for the reproduction of capitalist-liberal hegemony and thus a privileged site of class struggle. Nevertheless, the understanding of the state in terms of class and economic power has been rejected by post-modernist approaches to the state. For Foucault, power relations spill over the premises of the state and are dispersed in the social field, which is a fluid and unstable constellation consisting of a constant and inexorable struggle (Kalyvas 2002: 111). As such, the state is no longer a privileged terrain of power container, but one contingent site of power among many others. This understanding dissolves the states specificity, autonomy and superiority (Kalyvas 2002: 111). If the state is only decentered in Foucault, Mitchell abandons caution to announce the ultimate death of the state. Mitchell moves beyond Foucault to reduce the state to a mere effect of power relations, to a metaphysical illusion, to a simple metaphor and a discursive construction without material and structural existence (Kalyvas 2002: 112). As a consequence, the state is no longer a valid domain worthy of investigation. The competing approaches to the nature of the global order and the state are central to political and media democratization with the ascendance of transnational media. Political economists arguably associate the transnational media with an agent of domination of global information market along the free market lines, instead of commitment to democratization in authoritarian countries of global East and South (Waisbord and Morris 2001; Zhao and Hackett 2005; Schiller 1996; Sklair 2001; McChesney and Herman 1997). The transformation of the state in the making of capitalist global order is ominous for democratization. For those alarmists, globalization has led to a reassertion of the power of global capital at the expense of organized labour and the democratic state (Panitch and Leys 1999). As McChesney (et alt 1998) warns, globalization is distinctly undemocratic as it favors the interests of globally mobile capital over the equality of workers. Garry Rodan and Kevin Hewison (2006: 6) make similar observations, arguing that neo-liberal globalization is elitist and anti-democratic in the sense that it has discouraged interest representation from the decision-making process. Richard Robison (2006: 37) points to neo-liberal policies of the US actually limiting democracy in East Asia. Briefly, they argue that under neo-liberal globalization and anti-terror war, the US has prioritized good governance over democratization, freedom over liberal political values in its foreign policy and rhetoric towards East Asia. For David Harvey (2005: 64-66), neo-liberal theorists consider participatory democracy as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties. The neo-liberal global order has witnessed the transformation of both ACS and the authoritarian states and the relationships between the two. To spread neo-liberalist market economy across the world, the capitalist-liberal state may have common interests with the capitalist-authoritarian state, which was previously considered as the bogeyman of information and political democracy. Take the role of the US and China in the global order as an instance. In the spreading of the capitalist relations to the whole world, the US embraces its role as enforcer of the global order, while China seems to play a partner to run the global capitalist order (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 12; Harvey 2005: 120-151). Panitch and Gindin (2004: 59) argue, Chinas development does not necessarily lay the ground for a challenge to the American empire and the revival of inter-imperial rivalries, but may emerge as a pole of inter-imperial power. Under neo-liberalism, whether the liberal democratic US or the authoritarian China, chooses to create a good business climate at the expense of collective rights of labour (Harvey 2005: 70). As Jonah D. Levy (2006: 368) argues, the US state, one of the affluent democracies, is moving from a market-directing to a market-supporting orientation. China is committed to the formation of market economy too, although the nature of the Chinese state is yet to be decided. There are already a number of taxonomies available to characterize the nature of reform China (Baum and Shevchenko 1999: 333-334; Guo 2000: 163). But a central question is yet to be addressed: Is the Chinese state shaping the capitalist social formation and evolving towards a neo-liberal state? Harvey (2005: 150-151) argues, China has definitely moved towards neoliberalization and the reconstitution of class power, in which the party sides with the capitalist enterprises at the expense of the masses. But Harvey points out that China is not a pure neo-liberal state, as China still has heavy state intervention in the economy and management of the currency. Dissenting with Harveys assertion of Chinas ideological commitment to neo-liberalism, Zhao (2007: 25-26) draws on what Ong (2006) calls neo-liberalism as exception, exception to neo-liberalism and argues that we cannot rule out that the Chinese state is selectively deploying neo-liberal strategies to build a socialist market alternative. Chinas socialist and anti-imperialist legacies and the revitalization of the new left will challenge any hasty conclusion on the capitalist nature of the Chinese state. Zhao points that the nature and future direction of the Chinese state is still open-ended, as the state has not openly abandoned its socialism and anti-imperialist legacies. From their contending analyses, it is uncertain that the capitalist social formation is shaping in the Chinese state. But it is arguable to consider neoliberal elements at least as strategic selectivity of the Chinese state with the ascendance of technocratic elite. For Harvey, the contradictions and conflicts between the logic of territories and the logic of capital will lead to a lot of potential tension in the world. With regards to the Sino-US relations, although the US is trying to set up political alliances across a whole set of very disparate regimes, it is difficult for the US and China to set up such an alliance due to their conflicting logic of territories. Therefore, we may not rule out the possibility of China as a challenger to redefine the current global order. At least at the moment, however, China is colluding with the American-dominated global capitalist order (Zhao 2007). As William Thornton (2006) argues, whether the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus, they are united in their willingness to sell out the working classes. Their show of acrimony should not confound the Left to ignore that both are locked in a warm capitalistic embrace. In condemning the Washington Consensus, he warns, we should not approve the Beijing Consensus and consider it as an alternative, instead of alternate, to the Washington Consensus. He concludes that Chinese capitalism has joined hands with neoliberalism in labor practices that ensure a global rush to the bottom. Out of strategic adaptation to market economy and neoliberal globalization, the U.S., the biggest capitalist-liberal state, and China, the biggest capitalist-authoritarian state, have commonly limited the articulation of the masses interests in favor of the capital. As Rodan and Hewison (2006: 6) argues, neoliberalism envisages the establishment of a level playing field which exempts interest representation, particularly for those to challenge the social, political and economic power of elites through collective forms of political organization. As China has proactively embraced neo-liberal globalization, there have been nuances of the US state attitude toward democratization in China and the archetypical American mainstream media narratives of the popular resistance in China, which has been unleashed by market forces in what Polanyi (1944) called the double movement. In neoliberal globalization, therefore, problems of citizenship, democracy and political representation can be no longer exhaustively defined in purely national political processes (Pierson 2004: 182; Held 1995). This gives rise to a central question for resistance and emancipatory communication: Where will be our strategic terrain of struggling for social justice and equality? Who will be our political targets? As Duffy and Everton (2007: 113) point, this question has been debated within the international left between those who call for changing the world without taking power and others who ask for the emancipation from the neo-liberal globalization via the state. The state has been under-analyzed in the fashionable globalization theories with the overemphasis on the erosion of the state power (Waisbord and Morris 2001). Postmodern and poststructuralist discourses, with emphasis on the diffusion and multiplicity of power, have dislocated the state as a pivotal and sovereign power center. As such, the tendency is that social movements and the subordinate resistance shift from concentrating on the capitalist state and class structure toward the condemnation of international institutions and struggle for a global society for human rights. Hardt and Negris Empire epitomizes this trend. For them, the traditional opposition, which ascribed political subject to the proletariat, has been completely destroyed by the Empire. Instead, the multitude is emerging as the new agent of opposition (Hardt and Negri 2000; Aronowitz and Nratsis 2002). By contrast, the political economy has conceptualized the state as the site of contestation and called for attention given to the transformation of the state, in stead of a net increase or decline of the state power in globalization (Jayasuriya 2000: 315). As Mosco (1996: 75) argues, the global pressure to privatization has concerned the political economy to address the instrumental and structural roots of the process. Through historical examination of the rise of the global media, Winseck and Pike (2007) argue that the relationships between governments and communications companies were highly ambiguous and contingent. The political economy acknowledges the states both constitutive and reactive roles, recognizes the state as the container of power and conceives of the state and the market as mutually constitutive and variable (Mosco 1996: 202-204). As McChesney (1999) argues, the state plays a key role through (de)regulation in promoting the hypercommercialism. Sussmans (2005) investigation of American midlevel functionaries to export neo-liberalism through political consulting on behalf of the capital and the state illustrates the role of the state in guaranteeing a pro-capitalist global political economy for the capital. Schillers (2007) latest work on the capitalized information animates the constitutive role of the U.S. state in creating amenable conditions for the capital under the pretence of global competitiveness. Schillers previous Theorizing Communication: A History (1996) and Digital Capitalism (2000) contained a similar analysis. The acknowledgement of the states both constitutive and reactive role has endowed the state as the best hope for harnessing market forces of media globalization and fulfilling democratic function (Boyd-Barrett 1997; McQuail 1992). As Held (1996) argues, demonization of the state effectively eliminates the democratic aspirations of ordinary people, which, after all, constitute the leitmotif for a state in original theories of democracy. As such, political economists recognize that the resulting reduction of democratic accountability and public service can be corrected via the state. In their empirical research on cyber-capitalism, Schiller and Mosco (2001: 7) identify the importance of national control and public service principles in resisting the business-led integration. This analysis echoes calls for holding the state as the locus for political activity or hub for cultural solidarity (Waisbord 1998; Giddens 1985; Garnham 1986). The state regulation in advanced capitalist societies may maintain national and cultural identities, and cordon off spaces for political democracy and participation (McKercher 2001). Even for developing countries, Nordenstreng argues, the state is obligatory to democratize the material conditions for a participatory civil life by addressing poverty and inequality. It is wrong to count on the civil society or market rules to do so. For Nordenstreng (2001: 160), developing countries should not replace an undemocratic state with an undemocratic global market. Hallin (2000) illustrates through the Mexican example that the state is not necessarily antagonistic to the democratic public sphere. Duffy and Evertons (2007) latest case study of Venezuelas efforts to constitute a pluralist and democratic media system has also questioned the dichotomy of statist versus civil society strategies. 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